Study Group - Madhyamakavataranama

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Generate a virtuous motivation thinking, 'I have to become enlightened for the benefit of all sentient beings. For that purpose I'm now going to listen to this profound teaching, and then I'm going to put it into practice as much as possible.'

3.5.1.1.1.2.2.1.1.2.1. Refuting Generation from Other in Relation to Consecutive Cause and Effect (cont.)

3.5.1.1.1.2.2.1.1.2.1.1. Actual refutation

We completed this last time and now we come to the second outline.

3.5.1.1.1.2.2.1.1.2.1.2. Rejecting the Objection (to the refutation)

The root text reads:

If said, 'just as the upper and lower ends of a scale Aren't seen at different times, the generation and cessation Of that generated and the generator are similar.'

Previously the Prasangika rejected generation from other based on consecutive cause and effect. Now the **Realists** say,

'Just as two upper and lower ends of a scale aren't seen at different times, similarly, since the actions of generation and cessation of that generated, the sprout and the generator seed are simultaneous, the seed and sprout are also simultaneous.'

The higher and lower ends of the scales can be seen at the same time, and also the action of going up and down is performed simultaneously. Similarly the ceasing of the seed and the generating of the sprout also happen simultaneously, and the seed and sprout are also simultaneous. Therefore your argument that the sprout isn't generated from other because the sprout doesn't exist at the time of the seed is invalid.

The root text continues:

If concurrent, then non-existent since not at the same time here. If that generating is non-existent as approaching generation and Although that ceasing exists but posited as approaching disintegration Then in which way are they similar to the scale?

Mirror:

The Prasangika refute that by saying, 'It follows that the seed and sprout aren't *similar to the scale in* any *way*, - because even *if* the ends of the scale exist *concurrent*ly, *since* seed and sprout don't exist *at the same time here*, their synchronicity is *non-existent*, *since the generating* sprout *is non-existent* at the

time of the seed *as approaching generation* and even though *the ceasing* seed *exists*, *it is posited as approaching disintegration*.

The generating sprout is non-existent at the time of the seed when it approaches generation. Even though the ceasing seed exists at the time of the seed, it is posited as approaching disintegration. So therefore the sprout and the seed don't exist at the same time.

The sprout is the future of the seed, so it doesn't exist at the time of the seed. Even though the generation of the sprout exists at the time of the seed, the sprout doesn't exist at the time of the seed, because the sprout is the future of the seed. However the actions of the sprout being generated and the seed disintegrating happen simultaneously. The disintegration of the seed exists at the time of the seed.

If the generation of the seed was an inherent generation then there couldn't be any distinction between the generation of the seed and the seed. If the generation of the sprout were to exist inherently, then it would follow that there couldn't be any distinction made between the sprout and the generation of the sprout. Then the sprout would have to exist at the time of the seed.

First there was the refutation by the Prasangika¹ which said, 'How could the sprout be inherently other from the seed? It isn't - because the sprout and seed aren't simultaneous - since at the time of the seed the otherness sprout is non-existent.' There the Prasangika were refuting the Realists by saying that sprout and seed cannot be inherently existent others because they're not simultaneous.

To that the Realists said that just as the two upper and lower ends of scales aren't seen at different times, then similarly to the actions of generation and cessation of the generated and the generator seed being simultaneous, the seed and sprout are also simultaneous.

Then the Prasangika refute that by saying that first of all seed and sprout are not simultaneous, and that they're not like the scales in any way. Even if one were to say that the ends of the scales existed simultaneously and concurrently, the seed and sprout don't exist at the same time, so their synchronicity is non-existent. However the action of the seed disintegrating and the sprout generating are simultaneous, but this doesn't mean that because of that the seed and sprout are simultaneous. Even though the generation of the sprout exists at the time of the seed, the sprout doesn't exist at the time of the seed because the sprout is the future of the seed. If the generation of the sprout and the disintegration of the seed exist simultaneously then that doesn't mean that sprout and seed also exist simultaneously.

If the generation of the sprout was to be an inherent generation and if the disintegration of the seed was to be an inherent disintegration, then those two also couldn't exist simultaneously. So when it says that the disintegration of the seed and the generation of the sprout don't exist simultaneously this is referring to the inherent disintegration and inherent generation of seed

¹ See the teaching of May 6 2003, page 3.

and sprout. Nominally the disintegration of the seed and the generation of the sprout exist simultaneously.

In the previous outline generation from other was refuted by saying that a sprout and seed are not simultaneous, and therefore they cannot be inherently existent other. Then the Realists say, 'Well actually they are simultaneous, because they're seen at the same time. Just like the upper and lower ends of the scales, the generation and cessation of cause and effect are also seen at the same time. Therefore sprout and seed exist at the same time, and therefore they can be inherently existent other.

The Prasangika say that first of all seed and sprout are not simultaneous, so they're not similar to the scale in any way. Even though the ends of the scales exist concurrently, seed and sprout don't exist at the same time, so the synchronicity is really non-existent. Secondly the generating sprout is non-existent at the time of the seed as it approaches generation. So the sprout is actually in the progress of generating at the time of the seed. Therefore it has not really generated yet and doesn't exist at the time of the seed. Even though the ceasing seed exists, it is actually posited as approaching disintegration, so it is in the process of disintegrating. So the seed doesn't exist at the time of the sprout.

Without agent this generation isn't a logical entity.

The sprout's action of *generation* at the time of the seed *isn't a logical entity* of true existence because at that time the *agent* sprout is non-existent.

The Prasangika go on to say, 'Without agent this generation isn't a logical entity.' So the sprout's action of generating at the time of the seed isn't a logical entity of true existence. It isn't logically in the nature of true existence, because at that time the agent sprout is nonexistent. This refers to what was said before, which is that even though nominally the generation of sprout exists at the time of the seed, that generation of sprout is not an inherent generation. If it were to be an inherent generation then the sprout would have to exist at the time of the generation of sprout, and that is not the case. So therefore the sprout's action of generation at the time of the seed isn't a logical entity of true existence, because at that time the agent sprout is non-existent.

The action of sprout generating is dependent upon the agent of sprout. The action of the sprout generating and the sprout are interdependent. The generation of sprout exists in relation to sprout. If the sprout exists inherently then that which exists relative to it would also have to exist at the time of the sprout, and then one would arrive at the fault that the generation of sprout would have to exist at the time of the sprout, which it doesn't.

3.5.1.1.1.2.2.1.1.2.2. Refuting Generation of Other in Relation to Simultaneous Cause and Effect

This heading is also explained in the format of debate, where first the Realists explain their view, which is then refuted by the Prasangika.

In case the visual consciousness has otherness apart from

Its concurrent generators such as the eyes etc. And the simultaneously arising recognition etc., In case a Realist says, 'The fault expressed above concerning subsequent cause and effect doesn't exist because the visual consciousness has inherent otherness apart from its concurrent generators such as the eyes and so forth and the simultaneously arising recognitions etc.'

The Realist here is a Vaibashika. The Vaibashika don't say that cause and effect exist simultaneously, but they accept the existence of simultaneous cause and effect². They say here that the fault that was expressed concerning subsequent cause and effect doesn't really apply because the visual consciousness has inherent otherness that is different from its concurrent generator, such as the object, eyes and so forth, and the simultaneous arising recognitions. The eye-consciousness is generated from concurrent causes such as its object, the eye-sense-power, and from the simultaneously arising ever-present mental factors such as recognition, feelings, and so forth. The visual consciousness has an inherently existent otherness from those concurrent causes such as the object, eye faculties, and the five ever-present mental factors.

Basically what they say is that the visual consciousness exists at the same time as its object, the sense faculty, and also the ever-present mental factors. So the eyeconsciousness exists simultaneously with the object that it perceives, the eye faculty, the eye-sense-power from which it is generated, and the five ever-present mental factors. They say that all those simultaneous causes generate the visual consciousness. When a primary consciousness exists, then simultaneously with that the ever-present mental factors of feelings, recognition, contact and so on are seen as simultaneous cause.

This Realist obviously doesn't feel that the reasoning stated in the previous outlines applies to them, because they assert simultaneous cause and effect, saying that the visual consciousness, the object that it perceives, the sense faculty upon which it is generated, and the five ever-present mental factors that arise together with it are simultaneous causes. Therefore, they say, 'The reasoning saying that an inherently existent other doesn't exist because cause and effect are subsequent really doesn't apply to me. Because I accept simultaneous cause and effect, I feel quite safe.'

The Five Ever-Present Mental Factors³

2. Recognition

3. Intention

² Being mutually simultaneous and of different substance as well as mutually not obstructing each others generation is the definition of simultaneous cause.

³ 1. Feeling

From the *Compendium of Knowledge*. What is the definition of feeling? The definition of experience. The nature of experience through which the ripening of the results of virtuous and non-virtuous karmas are individually experienced. Feeling has the threefold division into happiness, suffering and equanimity.

A knower apprehending the uncommon characteristics of the object after (through) the coming together of object, faculty (sense power) and consciousness.

From the *Compendium of Knowledge: What is the definition of intention? The mental karma (action) making the mind manifest, having the function of making the mind engage virtuous, non-virtuous and non-predicted.* As is explained here, a mental factor that moves and directs its concomitant mind to the object is called intention. **4. Contact**

The five ever-present mental factors (feeling, recognition, intention, attention, and contact) are the simultaneous cause of the primary consciousness with which they arise. So every primary consciousness arises in conjunction with five ever-present mental factors

- 1. Feeling happiness, suffering, equanimity.
- 2. Recognition a mental factor apprehending the uncommon characteristics of the object.
- 3. Intention a mental factor that moves and directs its concomitant mind to the object is called intention.
- 4. Attention a mental factor having the function of making the mind apprehend the object.
- 5. Contact a mental factor that establishes the object concordant with the feeling to be experienced.

When the verse says:

In case the visual consciousness has otherness apart from

Its concurrent generators such as the eyes etc. And the simultaneously arising recognition etc.,

then that's the Vaibashikas talking.

The Prasangikas' refutation of the Vaibashikas' point of view is:

Since it arises while existent, what is the need? If it is said, 'Why, doesn't it exist then?' these faults were already explained.

Mirror:

The Prasangika reply, 'Consider the subject 'eye consciousness' - it follows that *since it arises* from the eyes and so forth, if it is asked '*what is the need*', that there is no need - because it *is existent* at the time of the eyes and so forth.'

If one were to ask the question, 'What is the need for the eye consciousness to arise again from its various causes?' then the answer that one would give is that there is no need. Why? Because the eye faculties, the objects, and so forth are already existent at the time of the causes. So saying that the eye consciousness arises from its causes is completely pointless.

If the Vaibashikas again say, 'Why would you say that there is no need? Doesn't the eye consciousness actually exist subsequently to its causes?' then they again backtrack on their point of view.

Then the Prasangika say that we already explained the faults of an inherently existing other in relation to consecutive cause and effect. If you backtrack on your position of simultaneous cause and effect then you would be correct nominally, but the faults of inherent generation from other relating to consecutive cause and effect would still to apply to you, as we already explained before.

Summary

The Prasangikas reason that first of all the generation of the sprout exists at the time of the seed, and the generation of the sprout and the disintegration of the seed are simultaneous.

To that the Realists reply, 'Oh so therefore sprout and seed also exists simultaneously! Because their generation and disintegration exist simultaneously therefore they exist simultaneously. Therefore your reasoning that generation from other doesn't exist because sprout and seed are not simultaneous doesn't apply.'

The Prasangika then say, 'Well the generation of sprout and the disintegration of seed are simultaneous, but just because of that the seed and sprout don't have to be simultaneous. Furthermore if the generation of the sprout and seed were to exist inherently then the generation of the sprout would have to exist simultaneously with the sprout. In fact the generation of the sprout and the sprout are interdependent. So if one of them exists inherently then the other one would also have to exist at the same time.'

So the different types of faults that are asserted by the Prasangika occur because of the mistakes that are present in the object of negation - inherent existence. They are all problems that exist because of the object of negation.

The difference between the two is that the Realists assert an inherently existent seed and sprout while the Prasangika assert a non-inherently existent seed and sprout.

The Prasangika say that first of all if seed and sprout were to exist inherently then the sprout would have to exist at the time of the seed, and also if the generation of the sprout were to exist inherently then also the generation of sprout and sprout would have to exist simultaneously. Of course they don't say that seed and sprout do exist simultaneously, but they say the mistake just outlined would follow if seed and sprout were to exist the way the Realists say that they do.

Therefore the Prasangika say that one should give up the point of view asserting the generation from other. The sprout and seed they are interdependent, so if they were to exist inherently then one couldn't posit them as having independence from each other. So one has to look at it from the point of view of the interdependent relationship of seed and sprout. They believe that if the sprout exists from its own side and the seed exists from its own side, then they both become independent and then they can't function as cause and effect. If two phenomena are mutually independent then they cannot have a cause and effect relationship.

So then maybe we can finish here for tonight. The next outline is refutation through analysing the four possibilities of the result and then we come to the outline of the that deals with the two truths which should be very interesting and useful.

The way this comes about is that the Realists make some

From the Compendium of Knowledge. What is contact? That which, after the three have been combined, becomes a power (that) establishes, having the function of acting as the basis for feeling. As such, a knower that, after object, sense power (faculty), and consciousness have been combined, establishes (clarifies, distinguish) the object concordant with the feelings to be experienced, such as happiness and suffering.

^{5.} Attention

From the *Compendium of Knowledge*: *What is attention? The engaging of the mind, having the function of making the mind apprehend the object (grasp at the object).* As such, a knower that places its concomitant mind on a particular object. The difference between intention and attention: Intention moves the mind to the object generality (the object in general), attention directs the mind to a particular (of the) object.

kind of objection to the refutation of generation from other, and then Chandrakirti refutes that objection with an explanation of the two truths. We can to get to that next time.

Correction and clarification from 6 May 2003

It can be completely generated; therefore it is definitely called effect, Whatever can generate that, even though other, is its cause. Of the same continuum and born from a generator Therefore the rice seedling doesn't grow from barley and so forth.

This verse from the root text shows the four characteristics of unrelatedness with the example of the barley seed and rice seedling. Since

- 1. the cause has to have the potential to generate the effect,
- 2. the effect has to be that generated by the cause,
- 3. cause and effect have to be of the same substantial continuum, and
- 4. the cause has to be the preceding similar type of the effect,

the barley seed and the rice seedling are unrelated.

Translator's note: These apply only to causal relationships, and numbers three and four apply only to substantial cause effect relationships

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Edited Version

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