
Study Group - *Madhyamakavatanama*

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First of all generate a virtuous motivation thinking, 'I have to become enlightened for the benefit of all sentient beings, and in order to accomplish that aim I'm now going to listen to this profound Mahayana teaching. Then I'm going to put it into practice as much as possible.'

3.5.2.1. Establishing the Selflessness of Phenomena Through Reason (cont)

Last time we finished the outline positing the thesis of selflessness, which was done with the thesis of being free from the four extremes. Today comes the outline establishing that thesis with reasoning.

3.5.2.1.1.2. Establishing the Thesis through Reasoning

Establishing the thesis with reasoning has four sub-outlines: refuting generation from self; refuting generation from other; refuting generation from both; and refuting generation from neither.

3.5.2.1.1.2.1. Refuting Generation from Self

Refuting generation from self has two sub-outlines: refutation with the reasoning from the commentary, and refutation with the reasons from *Root Wisdom*.

3.5.2.1.1.2.1.1. Refutation with the Reasoning from the Commentary

This outline again has three outlines: refuting the tenet holders asserting the realisation of suchness; showing generation from self doesn't exist nominally for those whose mind is not affected by tenets; and a summary of the refutation.

3.5.2.1.1.2.1.1.1. Refuting the Tenet Holders Asserting the Realisation of Suchness

Here again the outline has two sub-outlines: refuting generation from a cause that is of one nature (with the effect); and refuting that cause and effect are of one nature.

3.5.2.1.1.2.1.1.1.1. Refuting Generation from a Cause That Is of One Nature (with the effect)

Here the outline is the same as in *Mirror Clearly Reflecting the Meaning of the Madhyamaka*.

One doesn't have to make it very complicated; one has to just reflect on whether or not the sprout is generated. When a sprout is generated we can make these four assertions:

- The sprout is generated from self. No Buddhists accept this.
- The sprout is generated from others. Some Buddhists accept this.

- The sprout is generated from both. No Buddhists accept this.
- The sprout is generated from no cause. No Buddhists accept this.

The tenet that asserts generation from self is the **Samkhya** tenet. The Samkhyas assert that the cause is of one nature with the effect, the effect is of one nature with the cause, and the effect is generated from a cause that is of one nature with it. What Samkhyas say is that it would be incorrect for a sprout to be generated if it didn't exist at the time of its cause. The sprout is generated from its own nature. Such the sprout is of one nature with its cause while being different. In order for the sprout to be generated it has to exist at the time of the cause - it couldn't be generated if it didn't exist at the time of the cause.

The way the sprout exists at the time of the cause is in a non-revealed manner. The sprout is generated when the sprout is actually revealed to the eye consciousness. That happens when the skin of the seed, moistened by water, splits open and the tip of the sprout becomes visible. At that time the sprout hidden inside the seed becomes revealed to the eye-consciousness and is generated.

The Samkhyas also assert that if something has already been generated then it won't be generated again.

This outline deals with refuting generation from a cause that is of one nature with the effect and has three sub-outlines: the consequential meaninglessness if generated from a cause that is of one nature with it, being contrary to reason if so generated, and refuting objections to the refutation.

3.5.2.1.1.2.1.1.1.1. The Consequential Meaninglessness If Generated From A Cause That Is Of One Nature With It

This outline refutes generation from self by saying that if the sprout were to be generated from self then its generation would actually be meaningless.

This line from **Chandrakirti's** root text sets out this consequence:

It is without any merit if this arises from that.

This consequence states one fallacy that would arise if the sprout were to be generated from a seed that is of one nature with it. Ordinarily the generation of the sprout has merit, but the generation of the sprout becomes meritless if it is generated from a seed that is of one nature with itself, because then the sprout already exists at the time of the seed. This syllogism states that particular fault.

If it is asked, 'why isn't the sprout generated from self?' Take the subject 'this sprout': - if it arises from that seed then it is without any merit, - because at the time of the seed its nature is fully established.

Did you get that consequence? It is saying that should the sprout already exist at the time of the seed, then it would be pointless for the sprout to be generated again, because it already exists at the time of the seed. When we say that the seed is of one nature with the sprout and that the nature of sprout exists at the time of the seed, by 'nature' we mean the generation of the sprout. If the

generation of the sprout already exists at the time of the seed then it becomes meaningless for the sprout to be generated again, because it already exists at the time of the seed. This states the point of consequential meaningless if the sprout is of one nature with the seed.

3.5.2.1.1.2.1.1.1.2. Being Contrary To Reason If So Generated

Then the root text also gives a reason why it is invalid to be generated from self. So having first stated the consequence it now states a reason.

For the generated to generate again is completely senseless.

If further generation of that generated is asserted Then here the generation of sprouts etc. becomes unfindable,

And seeds will continually generate for eternity.

In relation to the first line, 'For the generated to again generate is completely senseless':

*Take the subject 'sprout'; - it is **completely senseless** for it to **generate again**, - because it has become **generated** at the time of the cause.*

The **Samkhya** actually accept the reason that if something is already generated that there is no need for it to be generated again. At the same time they say that the sprout exists at the time of the cause (at the time of the seed). Therefore, 'It is completely senseless then for the sprout to generate again, because it has already generated at the time of the cause.' It generated at the time of the cause because its nature exists at the time of the cause.

*If the Samkhyas then assert the further generation of that generated from the seed **then** it follows that [one] **the generation of sprouts etc. becomes unfindable here in this world, and [two] that seeds will continually generate for eternity from the time of planting because of the previous reasonings.***

Here **Chandrakirti** is saying to the Samkhya that it is completely senseless for this sprout to generate again, because it has already been generated at the time of the cause. If the sprout already exists at the time of the cause then we would actually have two generations of the sprout.

That is not something that the **Samkhyas** actually accept. The Samkhyas have their own interpretation of what the further generation actually is. They don't accept a repeated generation of the sprout, and actually agree with the point of view that if something is already generated, then there is no need for it to be generated again. When **Chandrakirti** gives this reasoning to the Samkhyas saying, 'According to you this fault would apply because according to you the sprout already exists at the time of the seed', then this is a reason that will lead the Samkhyas to understand their mistake.

The **Samkhyas'** position is that the sprout already exists at the time of the seed, so that the nature of the sprout exists already at the time of the seed. At the same time they also agree with that point of view that repeated generation of something that has already been generated would be pointless. Therefore the Samkhyas don't assert the repeated generation of the sprout. The assert only a single generation of the sprout, while at the same time

saying that the sprout already exists at the time of the seed.

Chandrakirti gives the reasoning that 'for the generated to generate again is completely senseless'. He says that for the sprout to be generated again is completely senseless because it was generated at the time of the cause. So Chandrakirti is saying to the Samkhyas, that it is completely senseless for something to generate again.

The **Samkhyas** will agree with that. What they don't accept is that the sprout is already generated at the time of the seed, and that's what **Chandrakirti** is saying to them. Because the sprout has already been generated at the time of the cause it is senseless for it to be generated again. So Chandrakirti's is trying to prove to the Samkhya that the sprout would be already generated at the time of the seed the nature of the sprout already exists at the time of the seed.

The nature of the sprout refers to the generation of the sprout, so if something is generated then it exists. Chandrakirti is saying that if the nature is there, its generation is there, and if its generation is there, then it exists at that time. Therefore since at the time of the seed, the nature of the sprout exists, the generation of the sprout exists, therefore the sprout exists at the time of the seed and its generation. So that is the reasoning with which a Samkhya can understand that the sprout doesn't actually exist at the time of seed.

The **Samkhyas'** position is that the sprout can only be generated from a seed that is in the nature of the generation of sprout. They say that if the seed didn't already exist in the nature of the generated sprout, then the sprout couldn't be generated from the seed. At the same time the Samkhya also say that repeated generation is pointless.

What **Chandrakirti** is saying is that, 'Well then, here you actually have a contradiction between your own points of view. On the one hand you don't accept repeated generation, but on the other hand you say the seed has to be in the nature of an already generated sprout. So actually you already have generation at the time of the cause, and then you assert further generation at the time of the effect. According to your point of view there is actually initial generation at the time of the cause, and then you assert further generation at the time of the effect. According to your point of view there is actually repeated generation.' That's the reasoning with which Chandrakirti is trying to show to the Samkhya the contradictions in their own point of view according to what they themselves accept, and that they are wrong. In effect the argument is, according to your point of view there is repeated generation. Why? Because the seed exists in the nature of the generated sprout.

After Chandrakirti has pointed out this fault to the Samkhya, then the **Samkhya** now refute Chandrakirti's attack.

3.5.2.1.1.2.1.1.1.3. Refuting Objections

The root text says:

Which everyway it alone breaks that up

Mirror says:

In case the Samkhyas object saying there isn't any problem because water, wind, etc., make the seeds soft, the sprout is generated, and the generated sprout breaks up the seed.

What the Samkhyas are saying is that when the seed meets with the conditions of water, wind, and so forth, which then make the seed soft and so forth, at that time the sprout is generated inside the seed. Then the sprout becomes visible when the skin of the seed breaks, and the sprout that has been already generated inside the seed breaks free from the seed.

The Samkhya refute Chandrakirti's reasoning saying, 'There's no problem, as I said before, because when the conditions of water, wind, etc., come together the sprout is generated within the seed, then the generated sprout breaks out of the seed. When the generated sprout breaks out of the seed, it actually destroys the seed.'

Then **Chandrakirti** refutes that by saying:

Take the subject, 'it, the very sprout': it follows that every way one looks at it, it doesn't break up that seed - because it is of one nature with the seed.

Here again Chandrakirti is turning the Samkhyas' reasoning back on themselves, giving back to them a consequence of their own reasoning saying, 'Actually, according to you, the sprout can't break up the seed. Why not? Because it is of one nature with the seed.'

The **Samkhya** say, 'Look at those two faults which you say my position has. They actually don't apply, because when the sprout breaks out of the seed it destroys the seed.'

Again **Chandrakirti** replies to the Samkhyas saying, 'Well, according to you, the sprout cannot destroy the seed because the sprout is of one nature with the seed. So it would be like the sprout destroying the sprout. That's what it is saying here - 'it follows that every which way one looks at it, the sprout doesn't break up the seed, because it is of one nature with the seed. If something is itself then it can't break up itself.'

3.5.2.1.1.2.1.1.2. Refuting Cause and Effect Being of One Nature

This has three sub-outlines which are mentioned in *Illumination*, but not mentioned in *Mirror*. They are: refutation with the consequence that the shape etc. of seed and sprout would become one; refuting the answer of the Samkhya to that consequence; and refutation with the consequence of concomitant apprehension.

Refutation With The Consequence That The Shape etc. Of Seed And Sprout Would Become One

In this outline **Chandrakirti** gives a consequence to the Samkhya.

For you, distinctive shape, colour, taste, potential and

Ripening different from the acting cause seed, are non-existent

Here Chandrakirti refutes cause and effect to be of one nature by saying, 'If they were of one nature then they couldn't be cause and effect, and couldn't have different shape, colour, taste, potential and ripening.'

Take the subject 'Samkhya': it follows that for you the

distinctive shape, colour, taste, potential, and ripening are different from the colour and shape etc. of the acting cause seed are non-existent, - because the seed and sprout are one.

'By saying that seed and sprout are one, you are actually contradicting direct perception.' **Chandrakirti** attacks the Samkhya, saying, 'Your point of view that cause and effect (a seed and sprout) are of one nature, is contradictory even to direct perception, because we can very clearly see that a sprout has a distinctive shape, colour, taste, potential, and ripening that differs from the characteristics of the seed. Here 'ripening' refers to the way phenomena can ripen in different ways if the conducive conditions are changed. For example if the gyurura tree, which yields a medicinal nut, is watered with milk then it can become sweet, when normally it wouldn't be sweet. So there can be different types of ripening of the object. Chandrakirti is saying to the Samkhya, you are mistaken, even by just looking at the sprout and the seed we can see that they of different nature because each has a distinctive colour, shape, etc, etc.'

The **Samkhya** reply to that saying, 'Your 'fault' that there couldn't be any distinctive shape, colour and so forth is not a valid consequence, because according to my point of view there can be distinctive shape, colour, and so forth, because the self of the seed ceases and then it transfers. So the self of the seed transfers to the nature of the sprout. Because the self of the seed transfers to the nature of the sprout, they can have different characteristics even though the sprout and the seed are of one nature.'

Refuting the Answer of the Samkhya to that Consequence

Consider if the phenomenon of the preceding self ceases, and changes to a different nature, then how can its be that?

Mirror:

In case the Samkhyas say consider what if the self of the preceding phenomenon seed ceases and transfers to the different nature of sprout? Then it would follow that that sprout can't be its, the seed's, nature.

So if that is your answer to my consequence that the nature of the seed transfers to the nature of the sprout, then it follows that the sprout can't be its, the seed's, nature.'

The Samkhyas say that at the time of the sprout the nature of the sprout has separated from the nature of the seed, and then **Chandrakirti** refutes the Samkhyas' points of view, saying, 'If it's like that, then the sprout can't be of the seed's nature.'

Is that clear? Next time we will probably be finished with generation from self. The next outline is the refutation of the generation from other.

Review

What is the object of refutation according the Svatantrika and according to the Prasangika?

Student: The Svatantrika definition of the object of negation is ***existence from its own side in its uncommon mode of abiding not being posited by an uncontradicted awareness.***

When we say 'not posited by an uncontradicted awareness' what does the 'uncontradicted awareness' mean? To an uncontradicted awareness there are two possibilities, either it is a direct perception or it is an inferential cogniser. For a direct perception to be uncontradicted it has to be unmistaken regarding the inherently existing appearance of the object. For an inferential cogniser to be uncontradicted means that it has to be uncontradicted regarding the inherent existence of the inherently existing determined object. So it's either unmistaken regarding the appearance or the determined object. Inferential cognisers are mistaken regarding the appearing object but unmistaken regarding the determined object.

What is the Prasangika object of refutation? ***Existing from its own side not being merely labelled by conception*** is the Prasangika definition of the object of negation.

There are five reasonings that establish selflessness, the lack of true existence. Can you posit them?

Students: The reasoning of one and many, the diamond sliver reasoning, the reasoning of existence and non existence of generation and cessation, the reasoning of the four possibilities of generation and cessation, and the king of reasonings

The first is?

Students: Investigating the nature of the object with the reasoning of one and many.

The second one is?

Students: Investigating the cause

Number three?

Students: Investigating the effect

Number four?

Students: Investigating cause and effect

Number five?

Students: The reason of dependent arising

When you meditate on emptiness then you use those various reasonings. For example, the self lacks true existence because it is dependent arising, or it lacks true existence because it is neither truly existent one nor truly existent many. So you use these various reasonings for your meditation.

One cannot understand emptiness without relying upon reasoning. One has to employ reasons to in order to understand emptiness.

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