
Study Group - Bodhicharyavatara

བྱང་ལྷན་སེམས་དཔའི་སྡོད་པ་ལ་འདྲུག་པ་བཞུགས་སོ།

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You need to generate a virtuous motivation of wanting to attain complete enlightenment for the welfare of all sentient beings, thinking, 'In order to attain that state I am going to listen to the profound teaching, and then I am going to put it into practice as much as possible'.

2.2.3.1. ANALYSIS OF CAUSE - THE DIAMOND SLIVER REASONING (CONT)

We have refuted generation from no cause and generation from other.

2.2.3.1.3. Refuting generation from self

2.2.3.1.3.1. Refutation of generation from a permanent primary principle

2.2.3.1.3.2. Actual refutation of generation of self

2.2.3.1.3.1. Refutation of generation from a permanent primary principle

That a permanent principle is the cause [126cd]
Of migrators is asserted by the Samkya.

In English, Samkya is translated as Enumerators. They are called that because they classify phenomena into twenty-five categories of objects of knowledge. One of these is the primary principle, which has the six qualities of permanence and so forth. This permanent primary principle is the cause of twenty-three categories of phenomena, but it is not the cause of the self. These twenty-three categories are expressions, or effects, of the primary principle.

The Tibetan term *dro-wa* in the second line is usually translated as migrators. Here however it refers to that which comes from the primary principle. The primary principle is the cause of its expressions.

Then the question is asked, 'If this permanent principle with six characteristics is the cause of all its different expressions, then what is exactly this primary permanent principle?'

The equilibrium of the qualities of [127]
Courage, particle, and darkness
Is strongly asserted as principle
And their imbalances are its expressions.

The Samkya assert that this primary principle is the equilibrium of the qualities of courage, particles and darkness. The imbalances of these three qualities are the results or expressions of the primary principle. For the Samkya the three terms root nature, primary nature, and primary principle are synonymous.

The primary principle has six qualities:

- The quality of creation because it creates existence.
- It is permanent because it does not change.

- It is a solitary unit that is partless.
- It is all pervading.
- It lacks the quality of clarity. For this tenet the quality of clarity is associated with awareness. The primary principle is an object and not awareness.
- The quality of the equilibrium of courage, particles and darkness. These three qualities of courage, particle and darkness can refer respectively to happiness, suffering and equanimity. They can also be related to the afflictions whereby then darkness is ignorance, particle is anger and courage is attachment.

The twenty-five categories of objects

- Of the twenty-five categories of objects the primary principle is the only object that is a cause but not an effect.
- The next seven categories are the five mere forms of visual form, sound, smell, taste and tactile sensations plus awareness and pride. These are both cause and expression so they are both cause and effect.
- Then we have the eleven faculties and the elements which are solely expressions. They are solely effects and not causes. They are:
 - The five faculties of awareness, which refers to the five sense-consciousnesses. For the Enumerators the five faculties of awareness are not the physical faculties, but are the five sense awarenesses.
 - The five physical faculties: the mouth, or sometimes the speech (1), the hands (2), feet (3) and the two lower body openings (4 & 5).
 - The five elements: earth, water, fire and wind and space.
 - The mental faculty.

That makes eleven faculties and five elements. Of the twenty-five categories of objects of knowledge these sixteen are only expressions or effects, but not causes.

- The person, who is neither a cause nor an effect, neither a cause nor an expression. The Samkya assert that the person, or the self, has the five qualities of engaging, permanence, not being created, lacking qualities, and lacking action. This was explained previously in *Introduction to the Middle Way*¹.

Initially the negation of the primary principle focuses on the refutation of a partless principle.

For one to have three natures [128]
Is invalid. Hence it does not exist.
Likewise, qualities do not exist
Because they each have three aspects.

Shantideva: One quality of the primary principle is that it is the equilibrium of the qualities of courage, particles and darkness. At the same time it is said that the primary principle is partless, and that it pervades all of its

¹ Teaching of 18 May 2004

expressions. But to say one partless object has three natures is invalid. Therefore the principle cannot be a truly existent, single, partless entity.

Further, since everything possess the three natures in this partless way, because of being pervaded by the principle there is nothing that can be 'one'. And if there is no 'one' then there is no 'many', because one and many are mutually interdependent. 'One' exists only relative to 'many', and vice versa.

Further, the individual three qualities themselves cannot exist as truly existent single objects, because each also possesses the three qualities in the same way.

*If there are no qualities then also the existence
Of sound becomes very far fetched.* [129ab]

If the three qualities don't exist then the primary principle cannot exist, and if the primary principle does not exist then the expressions of the primary principle, such as the five mere forms of visual forms, sounds and so forth, also cannot exist.

*It also becomes impossible for non-sentient
Clothes and so forth to have happiness etc.* [129cd]

Clothes and so forth is a reference to the five objects of tactile sensations, and so forth. The Samkya say that the five mere objects of visual form, sound and so forth are both expressions of the primary principle as well as causes themselves. Therefore, if the primary principle does not exist then none of these five mere objects can exist, because they are all expressions of the primary principle.

Another reason why they cannot be expressions of the primary principle is because they are non-sentient, and do not possess mind, which makes it impossible for them to possess the three qualities of happiness and so forth. Non-sentient objects such as clothes and so forth cannot be a single unit that possess three qualities of happiness and so forth for the very reason that they are non-sentient. They don't have awareness, and therefore cannot possess the qualities of happiness and so forth.

*If functionalities have a causal nature -
Haven't we already analysed functionalities?* [130ab]

If functionalities are in the nature of truly existent causes haven't we already refuted truly-existent functionalities?

The five types of objects are asserted to be both cause as well as expression. If happiness and so forth is generated from cloth and so forth, then since subsequently cloth and so forth do not exist, the primary principle (which is the equilibrium of happiness and so forth) would also not exist.

*Your cause is happiness and so forth -
From that cloth and so forth does not arise.* [130cd]

*Happiness and so forth arise from cloth etc. -
Because it does not exist happiness etc. does not exist.* [131ab]

If happiness were to be generated from cloth and so forth, then as the cloth and so forth would be non-existent, there would be no primary principle possessing the equilibrium of happiness and so forth. It is impossible to have an effect without cause. The text goes on to say to the Samkya, 'However, you cannot actually accept this

because you accept the primary principle to be a permanent functionality'.

*Happiness and so forth as permanent
Is absolutely not an object.* [131cd]

It follows that the nature of happiness and so forth is not permanent, because it is not the object of valid cognition perceiving it as permanent.

Samkya: Happiness is a permanent functionality.

*If happiness exists only when clear,
Why is it not apprehended at the time of experience?* [132ab]

Shantideva: The quality of clarity is only associated with awareness. If the clarity of happiness exists as a permanent functionality, then it should follow that the experience of happiness is apprehended at the time when suffering is generated.

Samkya: When suffering is generated the experience of happiness becomes a subtle one. The coarse experience of happiness ceases, and what is left is a subtle experience of happiness.

*If it becomes subtle then
How can it be coarse or subtle?* [132cd]

*Since it becomes subtle upon discarding the coarse
The coarse and subtle are impermanent.* [133ab]

Shantideva: It is not possible for happiness to cease being coarse and go to a subtle state, because you say happiness is permanent. If you say that at the time of suffering the coarse state of happiness is abandoned and becomes a subtle one, that is too difficult to apprehend, then that indicates that happiness is impermanent. Its nature changes from A to B.

*Similarly, why do you not assert
All functionalities to be impermanent?* [133cd]

*If the coarse is not distinct from happiness
Then happiness is clearly impermanent.* [134ab]

Similarly, why do you not assert all functionalities to be impermanent for the very same reason, because their nature changes from A to B?

Further, do you assert that the coarse is a separate, distinct, substantial entity from happiness, or do you assert that it is not a distinct, substantial entity from happiness?

In the first case, even though coarse happiness ceases one still experiences happiness, which therefore negates that the experience of happiness is coarse.

In the second case, if the coarse is not a distinct, substantial entity from happiness, then happiness becomes very clearly impermanent, because when coarse happiness ceases then also the happiness ceases. If you accept this, then the permanent nature of happiness and so forth has been refuted.

2.2.3.1.3.2. Actual refutation of generation from self

*In case you say whatever is non-existent
Can not generate because of not existing,* [134cd]

*You are firm on generation of the unclear,
Though not accepting it.* [135ab]

Samkya: If something does not exist within the cause

from the start, then it cannot subsequently generate, because it is not possible for something to generate newly.

Shantideva: What do you assert as the meaning of the generation of the sprout?

Samkya: The meaning of the generation of the sprout is the manifestation of the non-manifest sprout that is present in the seed. At the time of the seed the sprout is present in the seed in a non-manifest unclarified form. When the sprout clarifies, or manifests, then that is the generation of the sprout. But for that to happen the sprout has to be already present in an unclear or a non-manifest form within the seed.

Shantideva: If you say that then you affirm the generation of the new, because you are saying that something that did not exist earlier does exist later. So your understanding of the meaning of generation is the same as ours, even though you do not label it as such. You assert as generation that that which does not exist earlier, the manifest clear sprout, does exist later. Although you don't accept our terminology for that process, we both accept the same thing from the point of view of meaning.

You can see how the Samkya actually open themselves to the Madhyamaka argument. Initially they say they do not accept the generation of something new. They say that that which does not exist earlier cannot be subsequently newly generated. But then, when they actually give the meaning of generation, they contradict themselves. They say that the meaning of generation is that the unclear, non-manifest sprout that is present in the seed subsequently becomes manifest, or clear. What they are saying is that the manifest sprout, which did not exist earlier at the time of the seed, does exist subsequently. That is when the Prasangikas say, 'Well, if that is the case, then you assert exactly the same as us. Basically, you have contradicted yourself'.

*If the effect abides in the cause then [135cd]
One would eat faeces while eating cooked food.*

*One would have to pay the price of cloth [136a]
For the seeds.*

Samkya: Excrement is the result of cooked food, so it has to be present in the cause. The result is of a partless, single nature with the cause, and therefore excrement becomes of a partless single nature with the causal food.

Shantideva: In a similar vein, one could just go to the market, sell one's clothes, and then for the money buy cotton seeds and wear those cotton seeds. The cotton grows from the cotton seeds, so the cotton seeds are the causes of the cloth. So the cloth has to be present within the cotton seeds. Therefore one could wear the cotton seeds in the same way as one would wear the cloth itself.

Samkya (being a little stung by the argument): Worldly beings because of their ignorance do not see that the cloth is already present in the seeds, and therefore nobody would do such a thing.

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Edited Version

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